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CONFLICT OF LAW RULES BETWEEN




The conflict of law rules between China' and Taiwan is not a
popular topic in law reviews in the United States. There has only
been one article in 1989,2 one in 1990, 3 one in 1992, 4 and one in
1998. 5 Part I of this article serves as an update on this topic.
* S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Professor William P. Alford
and Professor Richard D. Parker for years of teaching and guidance. I want to thank Po-
fang Tsai, Bruce Y. Hsueh, Hui-wen Chen, and Ming-sung Kuo for their helpful comments
on earlier versions. I alone bear all responsibilities and welcome suggestions and criti-
cisms.
1 The meaning of the two words China and Taiwan is a politically contested issue. In
this paper, China and Taiwan are used as shorthand for the People's Republic of China
and the Republic of China respectively. The problems between China and Taiwan are
sometimes called the "cross-strait" problems, both because they are separated by the Tai-
wan Strait, and because the word "cross-strait" does not itself implicate the nation-state
status. Translations of Chinese and Taiwanese materials are my own unless otherwise
indicated.
2 See Wang Chih-wen, A Model for Soluing Legal Problems Between Taiwan and the
Mainland, 3 J. CHINESE L. 251 (1989). Chih-wen's article, while valuable, does not go
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As authors sometimes do, I think the topic I am writing about
deserves more attention than it has received so far. Part II of
this article explains the significance of this topic from two inter-
related perspectives. The first perspective is the social and his-
torical context in which this article is situated. The second is the
pivotal role of sovereignty in traditional jurisprudence. Taken
together, the mere existence of conflict of law rules between to-
day's China and Taiwan is very puzzling.
In order to address this puzzle, Part III of this article will high-
light two important pieces of legal scholarship written by Huang
Jin and Tung-Pi Chen, two professors of law. Though in different
ways, they make the argument that China and Taiwan should
have conflict of law rules between them regardless of whether
China and Taiwan are two nation-states or together a single na-
tion-state called China. This is an important argument, both be-
cause this is the primary legal foundation on which China and
Taiwan build their current social and economic interdependence,
and because this suggests a new understanding of sovereignty.
Notably, sovereignty itself remains intact but becomes discon-
nected from other issues.
I. CONFLICT OF LAW RULES BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN TODAY
The starting point of this article is a sketch of China's and
Taiwan's conflict of law rules for the legal problems arising be-
tween them. I will focus on three basic topics in conflict of laws:
much further than the two works discussed in Part III of this article. Chih-wen's article
discusses the fact that even though both China and Taiwan are currently politically sepa-
rated, they each claim that their domestic laws apply to citizens on the other side of the
strait.
3 See Tung-Pi Chen, Bridge Across the Formosa Strait: Private Law Relations Between
Taiwan and Mainland China, 4 J. CHINESE L. 101 (1990), reprinted in FOREIGNERS IN
CHINESE LAW (CHINESE LAW: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, HISTORICAL, AND ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES) 245-69 (Tahirih V. Lee ed., 1997). This article will be discussed in more
detail in Part III.
4 See Ada Koon Hang Tse, The Emerging Legal Framework for Regulating Economic Re-
lations Between Taiwan and the Mainland, 6 J. CHINESE L. 137 (1992). Tse's article is
valuable, but does not go much beyond the two works discussed in Part III of this article.
5 See Rong-Chwan Chen, A Boat on a Troubled Strait: The Interregional Private Law of
the Republic of China on Taiwan, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 599 (1998). This article is also valu-
able, in that it analyzes the significance of Hong Kong's handover and its impact on the
Taiwanese legal system, but it is not more encompassing than the two works discussed in
Part III of this article.
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Article Five of the Regulation on the Problems of Jurisdiction
of Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial Litigation (guanyu
shewai min shang shi anjian susong guanxia ruogan wenti
de guiding), promulgated by China's Supreme People's Court,
and valid since March 1, 2002, states that the Regulation on the
Problems of Jurisdiction for Foreign-Related Civil and Commer-
cial Litigation governs the jurisdictional issue of the civil and
commercial litigation involving private parties of Hong Kong,
Macau Special Administrative Regions, and the Taiwan area.
China does not consider the Taiwan area "foreign," and therefore
China does not classify the civil and commercial litigation involv-
ing Taiwanese people or corporations as "foreign-related." None-
theless China needs to provide rules for the civil and commercial
litigation involving people and corporations from Taiwan. The so-
lution is a separate article-Article Five-because "Taiwan is not
foreign," but the same rules apply to both Taiwan-related and
foreign civil and commercial litigation.
Related to jurisdiction is the service of process on defendants,
i.e., to notify defendants of the commencement of suits. Acting as
the interface between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments
are China's Association for Relations Across Taiwan Strait
("ARATS")7 and Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation ("SEF").8
Both of them were formed as private organizations or founda-
6 According to a leading casebook on conflict of laws:
The parties involved in multistate activity should keep in mind three major ques-
tions: (1) Where can or should litigation take place? (2) Which law will the court ap-
ply? and (3) Where can one enforce the resulting judgment? These three questions
correspond to the three consecutive phases that comprise the process of judicial reso-
lution of most multistate disputes, namely: (1) jurisdiction; (2) choice of law; and (3)
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (Thompson-West 2003).
7 The most authoritative information about ARATS can be found on the website for the
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China:
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
8 See Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation, http://www.sef.org.tw (last visited Nov. 11,
2006).
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tions with government funding. When a court in Taiwan needs
to serve process on a defendant in China, the court in Taiwan
sends to Taiwan's SEF both, (1) a letter asking for assistance,
and (2) the process to be served. Taiwan's SEF then sends the
process to be served as well as another letter written by SEF to
China's ARATS. China's ARATS then sends a letter and the
process to be served to an appropriate Chinese court. That Chi-
nese court then serves that process on the defendant in China
and the defendant is notified of the commencement of the suit.
When a court in China needs to serve process on a defendant in
Taiwan, the same process occurs, just in the opposite direction.
This process suggests that even though process from a court is a
public document "from a government," process sent through the
ARATS-SEF channel, albeit "from a court" originally, becomes a
private document "from a non-governmental source." After Tai-
wan's former President Lee Teng-hui announced in 1999 that the
China/Taiwan relationship is a special state-to-state relationship,
the negotiations between China's ARATS and Taiwan's SEF have
never resumed.9 However, the SEF-ARATS channel continues to
serve processes for courts. Between June 1991 and November
2005, a total of 34,705 processes were served between China and
Taiwan.10
ii. Choice of Law
Between 1949 and 1987, China and Taiwan had almost no in-
teraction, whether in public or private sectors.1' The dawn of in-
teraction in the private sector in 1987 led to a series of problems
in the areas of contract, real property, succession, marriage, etc.
For example, some people who got married first in China before
1949 later got married again in Taiwan after 1949, the year
9 This is because China conditions the resumption of talks between the ARATS and the
SEF on Taiwan's acceptance of its one-China principle. China also argued that the simul-
taneous acceptance of the one-China principle by both China and Taiwan was what made
all the ARATS-SEF negotiations possible. In the negotiations for the charter flights dur-
ing the Lunar New Year in 2003, 2005, and 2006, China made public that it would not
negotiate with the staff of the SEF, i.e., the representative of Taiwan's government,
unless Taiwan's government accepted the one-China principle. Taiwan has not accepted
this request, and therefore the talks between the SEF and the ARATS have never re-
sumed.
10 http://www.sef.org.tw/xls/statist/stl4.xls (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
11 By "public sector," I mean government-to-government contacts open to the knowledge
of the public. By "private sector," I mean people-to-people contacts, such as travel and
marriages.
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when China and Taiwan separated. There were also people who
got married first in China before 1949, and, when their spouses
were stuck in Taiwan after 1949, got married again in China. At
first glance, these scenarios violated China's and Taiwan's prohi-
bition against bigamy. Between 1949 and 1987 however, there
was hardly any contact between China and Taiwan, which makes
these scenarios distinguishable from the vices the prohibition
against bigamy traditionally has been intended to prevent. 12 In
the immediate years after 1987, China and Taiwan had a di-
lemma. On the one hand, in order to uphold the integrity of law,
China and Taiwan seemingly had to void all such instances of
"bigamy." On the other hand, there were so many instances of
"bigamy" that the potential consequences of invalid marriages for
unknowing spouses and children of the second marriage were
grave. Similar dilemmas also arose in the areas of contract, real
property, succession, and so on. Both China and Taiwan promul-
gated rules specific for such instances.
Except for those rules, China has not formally promulgated
specific choice of law rules for its private law relationships with
Taiwan. The lack of formal choice of law rules makes it appear
that China does not have choice-of-law rules for its private law
relationships with Taiwan. This appearance, however, might be
misleading, given the existence of the five hundred seventy nine-
page book, The Taiwan-Related Trial Practice and Case Analy-
ses,13 published by the P.R.C. Publishing House for China's Peo-
ple's Court (renmin fayuan chuban she).
In this book, on pages twenty-five and twenty-six, Qi Shu-jie,
Zhu Zhen-niu, and Chen Gao-run, a scholar and two judges, note
that Taiwan's law has not been given legitimacy by China's Peo-
ple's Court, and China's Supreme People's Court has not made
any interpretation of this issue. 14 They argue that some disputes
in Taiwan-related economic relationships are difficult to be adju-
12 The point I want to convey in this sentence is: The prohibition against bigamy envi-
sions a husband and a wife living together with no more spouses. In those "bigamy" sce-
narios in China and in Taiwan, however, what happened were just a husband and a wife
living together with no additional spouses.
13 THE TAIWAN-RELATED TRIAL PRACTICE AND CASE ANALYSES (Zhu Zhenniu et al eds.,
2001).
14 See Qi Shu-jie, Zhu Zhen-niu, and Chen Gao-run, The Legal Problems in the Civil
and Commercial Litigations Related to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (she gang ao
tai minshangshi shenpan de falu wenti), in THE TAIWAN-RELATED TRIAL PRACTICE
AND CASE ANALYSES, supra note 13, at 17, 25-26.
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dicated correctly and effectively if Taiwan's relevant laws are not
applied, citing the differences between China's and Taiwan's
partnership law, and urge China's legislature or Supreme Peo-
ple's Court to respond as soon as possible.
On pages twenty-nine and thirty, however, Ho Pei-Ming,15 a
Chinese judge, disagrees with the idea that Chinese judges
should not apply Taiwan's law. He notes that an anonymous
partnership is not provided for in the Chinese law but explicitly
provided for in Taiwanese law, and argues that the anonymous
partnership agreements made by investors from Taiwan based on
their knowledge of Taiwan's law should be valid and protected by
China's law, because of, as explained on page twenty-nine, the
importance of "realistically" (shi shi qiu shi) ascertaining the liti-
gation status (susong diwei or standing) of such anonymous
partners.
On page fifty-two, Wu Hai-Yan and Xu Jun-jiang, 16 two P.R.C.
judges of the Xiamen Maritime Court (Xiamen haishi fayuan),
assert that, because of China's one-China principle, Taiwan's law
does not apply when the Xiamen Maritime Court adjudicates
Taiwan-related cases. However, in Wu and Xu's next sentence,
Wu and Xu say that the Xiamen Maritime Court recognizes
(renke) the factual effects (shishi xiaoli) of Taiwan's law, and the
example they use is that, the corporations formed according to
Taiwan's law should be considered as legal persons. This ap-
proach of "Taiwan's law as facts," according to these two judges,
is consistent with the spirit of China's Regulation on the Prob-
lems of Jurisdiction of Foreign-Related Civil and Commercial
Litigation (zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fa
yuarenke Taiwan diqu youguan fayuan minshi panjue de
guiding), promulgated by China's Supreme People's Court and
described earlier. Moreover, according to Wu and Xu, when the
parties agree to apply Taiwan's law, if China's law does not regu-
late that specific problem, Taiwan's law on that problem is appli-
cable as a local custom (difang guanli).
15 See He Pei-Ming, The Basic Situation and Several Legal Problems of Taiwan-Related
Economic Trials (she tai jingji shenpan jiben qingkuang ji jige falu wenti),
in THE TAIWAN-RELATED TRIAL PRACTICE AND CASE ANALYSES, supra note 13, at 28.
16 See Wu Hai-yan & Xu Jun-jiang, To Seriously Adjudicate Maritime Disputes Related
to Taiwan With the Purpose of Facilitating Healthy Development of Cross-Strait Shipping
(renzhen shenli she tai haishi anjian cujin liangan hangyun jiankang faz-
han), in THE TAIWAN-RELATED TRIAL PRACTICE AND CASE ANALYSES, supra note 13, at 48.
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It is an area of law that needs further investigation.
iii. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
In contrast, China has a clear rule recognizing and enforcing
civil judgments rendered by Taiwan's courts. China's Supreme
People's Court promulgated the Regulation on the People's
Courts' Recognition of the Civil Judgments Made by the Relevant
Courts in the Taiwan Area, valid since May 26, 1998. Its Article
Two says that parties of civil judgments of the relevant courts in
the Taiwan area may apply for recognition in the People's Courts
provided that the parties' (1) domicile, or (2) place of usual resi-
dence, or (3) place where the property enforced against is located,
is in China.
B. Taiwan
Taiwan's statute Law on the Relationship between the People in
the Taiwan Area and the People in the Mainland Area (Taiwan
diqu yu dalu diqu renmin guanxi tiaoli)17 governs the con-
flict of laws between China and Taiwan in Taiwan's courts.
Based in large part on this statute, below I will briefly introduce
Taiwan's conflict-of-law rules.
i. Jurisdiction
According to Lee Hou-Jen, a Taiwanese judge specializing in
Taiwan's conflict-of-law rules, the jurisdiction issue in civil mat-
ters between the mainland area and the Taiwan area should be
determined according to the "reason of law" (fali) of the jurisdic-
tion issue in foreign-related civil matters.18
Such a vague statement warrants a more detailed explanation.
In his treatise devoted to Taiwan's conflict-of-law rules for China,
17 Taiwan's Law on the Relationship Between the People in the Taiwan Area and the
People in the Mainland Area became valid on July 31, 1991. The translation of the name
of this statute from mandarin Chinese into English yields varying titles, such as The
Statute Governing Relations Between People of the Areas of Taiwan and Mainland China,
another being the Act Governing Relations Between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the
Mainland China, and lastly the Law on the Relationship Between the People in the Tai-
wan Area and the People in the Mainland Area. Irrespective of any differences in transla-
tion the Chinese text prevails. However, for clarity's sake the text of this article will refer
to the statute using the last of the translations listed above: Law on the Relationship Be-
tween the People in the Taiwan Area and the People in the Mainland Area.
is LEE HOU-JEN, CROSS-STRAIT CIVIL RELATIONS STATUTE AND TRIAL PRACTICE (lian-
gan minshi guanxi tiaoli yu shenpan shiwu) 142-43 (1994).
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from page 127 until the last three lines of page 141, Lee discusses
how Taiwan's law addresses the jurisdiction issue in foreign-
related civil matters, without mentioning "the mainland area"
(i.e., China) at all. Beginning at almost the end of page 141, Lee
asks whether the concept (guannian) of jurisdiction discussed in
his earlier pages can be applied to the relationship between the
mainland area and the Taiwan area. 19 Lee says the concept of ju-
risdiction discussed in his earlier pages allocates judicial affairs
among nation-states, which is different from the relationship be-
tween the mainland area (i.e., China) and the Taiwan area, two
areas within a single nation-state. However, Lee argues that the
China/Taiwan context is similar to that between two nation-
states because there has been no possibility for civil courts of the
two areas (i.e., China and Taiwan) to transfer their cases to each
other's courts. As a result, the concept of jurisdiction in Taiwan's
private international law can be applied to the relationship be-
tween the mainland area and the Taiwan area. In other words,
although Taiwan's Law on the Relationship Between the People in
the Taiwan Area and the People in the Mainland Area has no
provision explicitly governing the jurisdiction issue, Lee asserts
his own opinion that the jurisdiction issue in civil matters should
be determined on the basis of the "reason of law" (fali) of the ju-
risdiction issue in foreign-related civil matters. What, after all,
is the "reason of law" of the jurisdiction issue in foreign-related
civil matters? It means the civil courts of the Taiwan area have
jurisdiction if those courts have jurisdiction according to Tai-
wan's civil procedure law, with the exceptions of honoring forum
selection clauses20 and of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
21
Then, how many Chinese people are plaintiffs or defendants in
Taiwan's civil courts? In 2004, in Taiwan's district courts, 95
Chinese people were plaintiffs and 2,938 were defendants. From
19 See id. at 141 ("The problem is whether the concept of jurisdiction in earlier pages
can be applied between the mainland area and the Taiwan area.").
20 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "forum selection clause" as
a "contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the country,
state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.").
21 See id. at 680 (providing that the term "forum non conveniens" shall be defined as
"[t]he doctrine that an appropriate forum--even though competent under the law-may
divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it ap-
pears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have
been properly brought in the first place.").
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January to October in 2005, in Taiwan's district courts, 93 Chi-
nese people were plaintiffs and 2,952 were defendants.
ii. Choice of Law
Taiwan's choice-of-law rules for cases between China and Tai-
wan are set out between Article 41 and Article 73 of Taiwan's
Law on the Relationship Between the People in the Taiwan Area
and the People in the Mainland Area. Ada Koon Hang Tse trans-
lates those articles into English in the Fall 1992 issue of the
Journal of Chinese Law.22 Those articles are also translated into
English by Taiwan's government, published on the website of
Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council.2 3
iii. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
Article 74 of Taiwan's Law on the Relationship between the
People in the Taiwan Area and the People in the Mainland Area
governs recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitral
awards. It has three paragraphs. The first paragraph provides
that "[t]o the extent that an irrevocable civil ruling or judgment,
or arbitral award rendered in the Mainland Area is not contrary
to the public order or good morals of the Taiwan Area, an
application may be filed with a court for a ruling to recognize
it."24 The second paragraph provides that "[wihere any ruling or
judgment, or award recognized by a court's ruling as referred to
in the preceding paragraph requires performance, it may serve as
a writ of execution. 25
The last paragraph provides that "[tihe preceding two
paragraphs shall not apply until the time when for any
irrevocable civil ruling or judgment, or arbitral award rendered
in the Taiwan Area, an application may be filed with a court of
the Mainland Area for a ruling to recognize it, or it may serve as
a writ of execution in the Mainland Area."2 6 The original Article
22 The Statute Governing Relations Between People of the Areas of Taiwan and
Mainland China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 179 (1992).
23 The Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council's website can be found at
http://www.mac.gov.tw (last visited on March 21, 2007).
24 ACT GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES OF THE TAIWAN AREA AND THE
MAINLAND AREA, TAIWAN MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, available at
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74 passed, on July 31, 1992, unconditionally gave effect to
China's civil judgments, but Taiwan added this reciprocity re-
quirement on May 14, 1997. As introduced earlier in this article,
China's Supreme People's Court on January 15, 1998 announced
The Provisions on the People's Courts Recognition of the Verdicts
on Civil Cases Made by Courts of Taiwan Province (zuigao ren-
min fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan renke Taiwan diqu
youguan fayuan minshi panjue de guiding), valid since May
26, 1998, to recognize and enforce the civil judgments rendered
by Taiwan's courts. Taiwan's High Court (Taiwan gaodeng fa-
yuan), on July 28, 1998, issued an official announcement that
China's The Provisions on the People's Courts Recognition of the
Verdicts on Civil Cases Made by Courts of Taiwan Province ful-
filled Taiwan's requirement for reciprocity. 27
According to the data provided by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs
Council 28 to Professor Rong-Chwan Chen,29 forty-four judgments
rendered by Chinese courts ordering divorce were recognized by
Taiwanese courts between 1998 and 2001. According to Rong-
Chwan Chen, there were three cases in which the Chinese court-
administered mediation records were not recognized by Taiwan-
ese courts; they were not recognized because Taiwan's Law on the
Relationship Between the People in the Taiwan Area and the Peo-
ple in the Mainland Area recognizes only "judgments rendered by
Chinese courts" 30 but not "Chinese court-administered mediation
records." 31 Chen also cites a case in which a Taiwanese court did
not recognize the judgment rendered by a Chinese court, because
the party failed to pay the court fees required by that Taiwanese
court in accordance with Taiwan's law.
27 See Dou Shaowu & Liu Qian, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, http://www.civillaw.com.cnlenglishlarticle.asp?id=988; see
also Graeme Johnston & Hester Young, Cross-Border Enforcement of Commercial Judg-
ments and Awards in China, http://www.pbpress.com/index.php?page=more-news_
article&id=PYQW9HL-5M9ZL-8E7EBMK-LILPXA9.
2s The Mainland Affairs Council is a ministry-level office in the Taiwan government.
29 See RONG-CHWAN CHEN, THE STATUS QUO AND PRACTICE OF THE CROSS-STRAIT
CONFLICT OF LAWS 291-92.
30 Id. at 291-92.
31 Id. at 291-92.
[Vol. 22:3
CONFLICTOFLAWRULES- CHINA AND TAIWAN
II. THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
Part I leads to this question: Why should anyone, with the ex-
ception of the practitioners in this area, care about those conflict
of law rules between China and Taiwan? In other words, what is
their significance?
I argue that the mere existence of such conflict of law rules be-
tween China and Taiwan challenges profoundly how sovereignty
has been understood. According to Richard C. Bush, a prominent
diplomat of the United States, "The sovereignty issue is at the
core of the cross-Strait [i.e. China/Taiwan] dispute; unless it is
resolved, the dispute will never be resolved.... Such a funda-
mental split cannot be papered over."32 Part II discusses the im-
portance of sovereignty from two different perspectives, the social
and historical context and the pivotal role of sovereignty in tradi-
tional jurisprudence.
A. The Historical and Social Context
From this perspective, sovereignty is important both because it
is the historical reason of the China/Taiwan dispute and because
most people today still regard it as the crux of the China/Taiwan
dispute.
Decades ago, the conflict between China and Taiwan was about
the authority to rule and represent internationally the combined
territory of China and Taiwan. At that time, Chinese and Tai-
wanese governments viewed each other as a rebel with whom no
negotiations on an equal footing could be held, because they did
not want to legitimize the rule of each other. Later, with the ad-
vent of Taiwan's democratization in the 1990s, the Taiwanese
government increasingly demands to negotiate with the Chinese
government on an equal footing.33 However, what China wants to
32 RICHARD C. BUSH, UNTYING THE KNOT: MAKING PEACE IN THE TAIwAN STRAIT 106
(Brookings Institution Press 2005).
33 To be sure, Taiwan has never agreed to talk with China on inferior footing. Chiang
Kai-shek and his son, long-term leaders of Taiwan, insisted that their government is the
only legitimate government of the whole China, encompassing both China and Taiwan. I
choose the word "increasingly" to refer to Taiwan's increasing demand for a status equal
to that of China. This quote succinctly illustrates the point:
According to some observers, Taipei has attempted to use the WTO framework to
regulate cross-strait economic relations. It is understood that the administration of
the DPP, the current pro-independence party, views the ability to talk with China on
equal footing as evidence of Taiwan's de facto independence. In this regard, no bet-
ter opportunity can be provided for Taipei than the WTO. Needless to say, talks
2008]
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avoid is exactly a sovereign statehood for Taiwan, and China re-
peatedly and firmly rejected any proposal of government-to-
government talks with Taiwan. 34 Therefore, since 1949 up to
date, China and Taiwan have not been able to figure out in what
standing they should deal with each other, whether state-to-
state, special state-to-state, center-to-province, center-to-Special
Administrative Region (SAR), two warring governments striving
for legitimacy, two parts of one single divided state aiming for fu-
ture unification, etc. In addition, while no actual hostilities
broke out after the 1950s, China and Taiwan continue to prepare
themselves for the coming armed conflict between them.35
with China in disregard of China's precondition of the "One China" principle helps
create an impression that Taipei is on par with Beijing. Taiwan has insisted on ne-
gotiating with China under the framework of the WTO since its accession. Taipei is
also cautious of any efforts by China to downgrade Taiwan's position in any inter-
national arena. It insists that its WTO mission in Geneva carry out bilateral trade
consultations with China under its official name, regardless of Beijing's acceptance
or opposition.
Qingjiang Kong, Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: What Are the Legitimate Expecta-
tions From the WTO?, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 91, 97 (2004) (footnotes omitted,
emphasis added).
34 The quote below poignantly demonstrates China's reluctance to have government-to-
government talks with Taiwan:
As a general practice, even in a forum where both Beijing's and Taipei's repre-
sentatives are present, Chinese officials have been unwilling to make contact
with Taiwan officials, let alone hold formal talks on any subject. Beijing is wary
that such formal contacts or talks may contribute to creating an impression that
Taiwan is on par with China and may be used by Taiwan to boost its image or
even expand its diplomatic space. China's diplomatic representatives are very
cautious in dealing with their Taiwanese counterparts on the occasion when both
are present. From the Chinese perspective, Taipei's relentless campaigns to ex-
pand its diplomatic space are independence-driven and thus China must ready
itself to block such efforts. Beijing views Taipei's use of the WTO framework to
regulate cross-strait economic relations as a pro-independence strategy and
therefore insists that contacts between the two sides are internal matters not to
be conducted under WTO auspices. The Chinese government was advised to pre-
vent the island from using the WTO as a forum for contacts.
Id. at 99-100 (footnotes omitted).
36 See MELISSA J. BROWN, Is TAIWAN CHINESE?: THE IMPACT OF CULTURE, POWER, AND
MIGRATION ON CHANGING IDENTITIES 212 (U. of Cal. Press 2004); Edward Friedman,
China's Dilemma on Using Military Force, in CHINA'S RISE, TAIWAN'S DILEMMAS AND
INTERNATIONAL PEACE 205 (Edward Friedman ed., Routledge 2006); Weixing Hu, The Po-
litical-Economic Paradox and Beijing's Strategic Options, , in CHINA'S RISE, TAIWAN'S
DILEMMAS AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE 205 (Edward Friedman ed., Routledge 2006);
MARTIN L. LASATER & PETER KIEN-HONG Yu, TAIWAN'S SECURITY IN THE POST-DENG
XIAOPING ERA (Routledge 2000); RUSSELL ONG, CHINA'S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA (Routledge 2001); IF CHINA ATTACKS TAIWAN: MILITARY STRATEGY,
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS (Steve Tsang ed., Routledge 2006).
The United States has an interest in peace within the Asia Pacific area, evidenced by
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Some analysts see Taiwan as one of the difficult, if not
the most difficult, issues from which a Sino-American War is likely. See, e.g., Edward
Friedman, Reflecting Mirrors across the Taiwan Straits: American Perspectives on a
China Threat, in THE CHINA THREAT: PERCEPTIONS, MYTHS AND REALITY 65 (Herbert Yee
& Ian Storey eds., Routledge 2002).
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To be sure, there is substantial economic or societal interaction
between China and Taiwan, and there are optimists who see
promises for future peace and prosperity from current interde-
pendence. Here are some basic facts: Since 2003, China has be-
come Taiwan's largest export destination, 36 while Taiwan has be-
come China's fifth largest source of foreign direct investment. 37
Indeed, "[a] total of $60 billion from Taiwan is invested on the
mainland. Perhaps half a million ROC nationals reside in China,
and Taiwanese make 3 million visits to the mainland every
year."38 Given these facts, optimists think the current social and
economic interdependence between China and Taiwan will, over
time, pacify their troubled relationship. 39 On the other hand, pes-
simists are skeptical that nationalist passions could be tamed by
the current level of interdependence, and caution that Taiwan's
economic dependency on China might endanger its security
should there be a future conflict between the two.
Both optimists and pessimists see a mismatch between politi-
cal conflict on the one hand, and economic and social interde-
pendence on the other, and ponder which would prevail in the
end. It is striking, however, that both optimists and pessimists,
while taking note of all sorts of legal issues about sovereignty, 40
36 See TAIWAN's MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE YUAN, CROSS-STRAIT
ECONOMIC STATISTICS MONTHLY, available at http://www.chinabiz.org.tw/maz/Eco-
Month~home.htm (last visited March 25, 2003).
37 See http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/162/29.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
China's four largest sources of foreign direct investment are Hong Kong, Japan, the
United States of America, and the British Virgin Islands.
38 DENNY Roy, TAIWAN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 244 (Cornell U. Press 2003).
39 There is a wealth of literature about the relationship between international trade
and national security. See, e.g., ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE
STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE (U. of Cal. Press 1981); ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AN ENDURING DEBATE (Edward D.
Mansfield & Brian M. Pollins eds., U. of Mich. Press 2003); EDWARD D. MANSFIELD,
POWER, TRADE, AND WAR (Princeton U. Press 1994); JOANNE S. GOWA, ALLIES,
ADVERSARIES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Princeton U. Press 1994); POWER AND THE
PURSE: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, INTERDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Jean-Marc
F. Blanchard et al. eds., Routledge 2000).
40 See Christopher J. Carolan, The "Republic of Taiwan": A Legal-Historical Justifica-
tion for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2000); Angeline
G. Chen, Taiwan's International Personality: Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones, 20
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 223 (1998); Lung-chu Chen, Taiwan's Current International
Legal Status, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 675 (1998); Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and
Taiwan, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (2004); Y. Frank Chiang, State, Sovereignty, and Tai-
wan, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 959 (2000); Michael C. Davis, The Concept of Statehood and
the Status of Taiwan, 4 J. CHINESE L. 135 (1990); Valerie Epps, Self-Determination in the
Taiwan/China Context, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 685 (1998); Zhengyuan Fu, China's Percep-
tion of the Taiwan Issue, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 321 (1996-1997); Eric Ting-
Lun Huang, The Modern Concept of Sovereignty, Statehood and Recognition: A Case
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pay virtually no attention to vast and growing literature. I will
quickly identify some important works in this literature. In Pro-
fessor Dominique T.C. Wang's 250-page book, Analysis of Con-
temporary Cross-Strait Legal Problems,41 sovereignty is discussed
in only ten pages. Another book by the same author, Analysis of
the Law and Practice of Investing in the Market of Mainland
China,42 has 560 pages but no space for the China/Taiwan sover-
eignty dispute. In Professor Rong-Chwan Chen's 457-page book
The Status Quo and Practice of the Cross-Strait Conflict of
Laws, 43 sovereignty is discussed in only six pages. In the 579-
page book The Taiwan-Related Trial Practice and Case Analy-
ses44 published by China's court, sovereignty is discussed only
briefly. Also, in the 449-page book Cross-Strait Civil Relations
Study of Taiwan, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 99 (2003); Eric Ting-lun Huang, The Evolution of
the Concept of Self-Determination and the Right of the People of Taiwan to Self-
Determination, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 167 (2001); Che-Fu Lee, China's Perception of the
Taiwan Issue, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 695 (1998); Tzu-Wen Lee, The International Legal
Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 351 (1996-
1997); Michael E. Mangelson, Taiwan Re-Recognized: A Model for Taiwan's Future Global
Status, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231 (1992); Peter R. Rosenblatt, What Is Sovereignty? The
Cases of Taiwan and Micronesia, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 797 (1998); Jianming Shen, Sover-
eignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1101 (2000).
Taiwan's participation in international organizations, discussed on the basis of Tai-
wan's legal status in international law, is where the focus has been. See, e.g., Susanna
Chan, Taiwan's Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the Conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275 (1994); Parris Chang & Kok-Ui Lim,
Taiwan's Case for United Nations Membership, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 393
(1996-97); Daniel C.K. Chow, Recognizing the Environmental Costs of the Recognition
Problem: The Advantages of Taiwan's Direct Participation in International Environmental
Law Treaties, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 256 (1995); Lori Fisler Damrosch, GATT Membership
in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China, and the Former Soviet Republics, 1992
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 19 (1992); James V. Feinerman, Taiwan and the GATT, 1992
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 39 (1992); Eric Ting-Lun Huang, Taiwan's Status in a Changing
World: United Nations Representation and Membership for Taiwan, 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 55 (2003); Walter J. Kendall, III, A Peace Perspective on the Taiwan United Na-
tions Membership Question, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 259 (1994); Chun Hung Lin, The In-
ternational Telecommunication Union and the Republic of China (Taiwan): Prospect of
Taiwan's Participation, 10 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 133 (2004); Josephine Wang-Ho,
Taiwan and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 61 (1992); Paul R. Williams, Creating
International Space for Taiwan: The Law and Politics of Recognition, 32 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 801 (1998); Mark S. Zaid, Taiwan: It Looks Like It, It Acts Like It, But Is It a State?
The Ability to Achieve a Dream Through Membership in International Organizations, 32
NEW ENG. L. REV. 805 (1998).
41 DOMINIQUE T. C. WANG, ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY CROSS-STRAIT LEGAL
PROBLEMS (2000).
42 DOMINIQUE T. C. WANG, ANALYSIS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTING IN THE
MARKET OF MAINLAND CHINA (2000).
43 RONG-CHWAN CHEN, THE STATUS QUO AND PRACTICE OF THE CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2003).
44 THE TAIWAN-RELATED TRIAL PRACTICE AND CASE ANALYSES (Zhu Zhenniu et al. eds.,
2001).
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Statute and Trial Practice by Lee Hou-Jen, a judge in Taiwan,
sovereignty is discussed only in passing. 4
5
This neglect cannot be explained by the historical and social
context alone. This neglect has to do with the pivotal role of sov-
ereignty in traditional jurisprudence.
B. The Pivotal Role of Sovereignty in Traditional Jurisprudence
What I call as traditional jurisprudence dominates the Chinese
and Taiwanese policymaking prior to 1987, the dawn of the
China/Taiwan interdependence. Besides, to a large extent, tradi-
tional jurisprudence is still relevant for today's world, given the
frequency the word "sovereignty" appears on legal and policy
documents, mass media and academic journals.
Scholars explain the pivotal role of sovereignty in different ways.46 First
of all, sovereignty is essential in defining what is "international." Sover-
45 LEE HOU-JEN, CROSS-STRAIT CIVIL RELATIONS STATUTE AND TRIAL PRACTICE 142-43
(1994).
46 See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New
Paradigm for International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447, 448 (1993). The author states:
The sovereign State as the prototype of international actor has become the
universal standard. Contemporary international law presupposes this struc-
ture of co-equal sovereign States. The international community's constitutive
set-up is dominated by it. The classical sources of international law depend on
the interaction of States in the form of treaties and customary law. Diplomatic
relations are conducted between States. Official arenas, like international or-
ganizations and international courts, are largely reserved to States. The pro-
tection of individual rights still depends mostly on diplomatic protection
through State representatives. Central concepts of international law, like sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, self-defense or permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources all rely on the exclusive or dominant role of the
State.
(footnote omitted) (citing Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 397, 406 (1991)).
This traditional conceptual framework is elsewhere termed "methodological national-
ism":
Methodological nationalism considers nation-states as the basic unit of all poli-
tics. It assumes that humankind is naturally distributed among a limited
number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and
delimit themselves externally from other nation-states. In addition, it assumes
that the external delimitation and the subsequent competition between nation-
states are the most fundamental concepts of political organization .... Meth-
odological nationalism sees national self-determination as ontologically given
and as the most important cleavage in the political sphere. This double premise
pre-determines empirical observations, as can be seen for example in the case
of aggregate statistics, which are almost exclusively categorized in national
terms. It locates and restricts the political sphere to the national level. (foot-
note omitted)
Michael ZIrn, From Interdependence to Globalization, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 235, 248 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (citing both
ULRICH BECK, TRANSLEGALE HERRSHAFT (2000), and ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1979)).
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eignty, the standing upon which entities in the international plane inter-
act, 47 demarcates the domestic plane from the international plane. "Interna-
tional law is a body of rules and principles governing relations between
sovereign States. '48 Besides, because sovereignty is the line demarcating
the two spheres, there is no grey area and no other word to describe the
non-existent grey area.49
Moreover, only after ascertaining whether there is any existing
law can anyone ascertain whether that law is followed or should
be changed. As a result, conceptually, the first step to deal with
any legal problem is to ascertain whether there is any existing
international or domestic law on point. If there is no existing
domestic or international law on that issue, the next step is to
ascertain whether the particular problem requires national or in-
ternational responses. If a national response is needed, then a
national legal process is followed to produce a statute from the
legislature, an administrative order from the executive, or a ver-
dict from the judiciary. If an international response is needed,
then the representatives of sovereign states meet to facilitate
concerted action, 50 whether in the form of unilateral but harmo-
nized national responses or multilateral treaties.51 As a conse-
47 See, e.g., MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
(Penn State Press 1995).
48 John Dugard, Preface to STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
(Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 2002) (emphasis added).
49 It is true that some scholars take note of alternatives such as trusteeships and asso-
ciated statehood, but such options have, so far, generally been considered "alternatives" to
the more common statehood.
50 It should be noted that the theory I am describing differs from the popular view rep-
resented in the following quote:
Two world views collide: the traditional view of the world consisting of sharply
distinguished compartments (the national States) and a view of an interde-
pendent world society with common values and with problems that can only be
solved through common efforts and with respect for universal, hence supra-
national, legal rules.
Marcel Brus, Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and International Govern-
ance: The Authority of Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE,
supra note 48, at 3 (footnote omitted) (quoting PIETER H. KOOIJMANS, INTERNATIONAAL
PUBLIEKRECHT IN VOGELVLUCHT 359 (2000), translation from Dutch by Marcel Brus).
Kooijmans set up a contrast between, on the one hand, a world consisting of sharply
distinguished compartments, and, on the other hand, a world society of common values
and common efforts to solve common problems. According to the theory I am describing in
this paragraph, however, this contrast is much less stark than how Kooijmans put it. Ac-
cording to the theory I am describing, the common efforts are, and should be, the coopera-
tion among nation-states, because the question of whether the values and problems are
common is considered equivalent to the question of whether nation-states have common
values and common problems. This is because nation-states are the only actors on the in-
ternational plane, according to that theory.
51 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., Cornell U. Press 1983).
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quence, to determine which process to follow when confronting a
legal problem, almost inevitably requires China, Taiwan, and
other international organizations or private groups to take a po-
sition on Taiwan's legal status in international law. For exam-
ple, should the governments in the world perceive and/or treat
Taiwan as a province of China or as a sovereign state?52 Does in-
ternational law govern the relations between China and Tai-
wan?5 3 Or, should China's domestic law apply to the relations be-
tween China and Taiwan because Taiwan is or should become a
part of China? Examples abound.54
52 See, e.g., Olufemi A. Elias, The International Status of Taiwan in the Courts of Can-
ada and Singapore, 8 S.Y.B.I.L. 93 (2004) (comparing two international cases with almost
identical facts, one concerning Canada, and the other, Taiwan); Moira McConnell, Devel-
opments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: "Forward this Cargo to Taiwan" Cana-
dian Extradition Law and Practice Relating to Crime on the High Seas, 8 CRIM. L.F. 335
(1997) (discussing Taiwan's attempt to claim exclusive jurisdiction in an international
dispute concerning a vessel bearing its flag); Ivan Shearer, International Legal Relations
between Australia and Taiwan: Behind the Facade, 21 AUST. Y.B.I.L. 113 (2000) (explor-
ing Australia's treatment of Taiwan); Paul R. Williams, Creating International Space for
Taiwan: The Law and Politics of Recognition, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 801 (1998) (outlining
the possibility of allowing recognition for Taiwan).
53 See, e.g., George E. Edwards, Applicability of the "One Country, Two Systems" Hong
Kong Model to Taiwan: Will Hong Kong's Post-Reversion Autonomy, Accountability, and
Human Rights Record Discourage Taiwan's Reunification with the People's Republic of
China?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 751 (1998) (examining hardships in bilateral relationships);
Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao, Is China's Policy to Use Force Against Taiwan a Violation of the
Principle of Non-Use of Force Under International Law?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 715 (1998)
(forecasting possibility of conflict between China and Taiwan); Christa Tzu-Hsiu Lin, The
International Criminal Court: Taiwan's Last Hope?, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 755 (1997)
(analyzing "legality" of possible acts China may employ towards Taiwan under interna-
tional law).
54 Two examples are handy. The first is how the United Nations responded to the
earthquake in Taiwan in 1999:
When a strong earthquake struck the central island of Taiwan in 1999, while
people lay buried under the rubble, [Kofi] Annan said that the United Nations
had to wait for the approval of the People's Republic of China ("P.R.C.") before
sending a disaster assessment team to what he called "the Taiwan Province of
China."
Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (cit-
ing both UN Sends Coordinating Rescue Team to Taiwan, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 22,
1999, and Corky Siemaszko, Taiwan Digging Out Frantic Rescuers Hunt for Quake Survi-
vors, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 22, 1999, at 7).
The second is the "panda problem" between China and Taiwan. When China wanted to
send a pair of pandas to Taiwan in 2005, Taiwan wanted to follow the procedure provided
in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES). The proposal to follow the CITES was rejected by China because China did not
want to give Taiwan the appearance of a sovereign state, to which the international law is
applicable. Should the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
apply? It seems that there are only two answers available. China does not want CITES to
apply, but the proponents of Taiwanese independence do want CITES to apply. The New
York Times reported on the event:
Taiwanese authorities expressed misgivings about accepting two pandas that
China offered the island at the end of a visit to the mainland by Lien Chan, the
chairman of the opposition Nationalist Party. Agriculture officials have called
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In other words, whether China and Taiwan are, or should be,
united as a nation-state or separated as two nation-states deter-
mines how China and Taiwan should handle all, not simply some,
of the cross-border legal problems between them. These two
questions are related as two steps in a single process of logical
reasoning and there is only a single body of law governing these
two questions. 55
Pundits know that the first step of the two-step process-
determining whether China and Taiwan are or should be united
as a nation-state or separated as two nation-states-is both ex-
plosive and impractical, both right now and in the foreseeable fu-
ture. China denounces the "international" choice and threatens
to use force if necessary. On the other hand, depending on which
political party wins the presidential election, Taiwan either (1)
disagrees with China's contention that China's Beijing govern-
ment can represent Taiwan internationally, 56 or (2) increasingly
denounces the "national" choice.57 The disagreement between
China and Taiwan is deep.
Then, how is it possible to establish any of those conflict of law
rules between China and Taiwan, as set out in Part I of this arti-
cle? This difficult question, a descriptive question of legal his-
tory, profoundly challenges the pivotal role of sovereignty in tra-
ditional jurisprudence.
In order to answer this descriptive question, I choose to focus
on the conflict of law rules in this article, because this area of law
is where I can find most sophisticated legal arguments. Part III
will discuss two much-cited academic works in support of conflict
of law rules between China and Taiwan.
for China to comply with international wildlife regulations in shipping the
pandas, in recognition of Taiwan's political separation from the mainland. Bei-
jing reportedly wants to handle the shipment as a domestic transfer of ani-
mals. Independence advocates, meanwhile, have been running newspaper ad-
vertisements suggesting that the offer of the pandas is a Trojan horse[.]
Keith Bradsher, World Briefing Asia: Taiwan: Beware the Trojan Panda?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2005, at All.
5 It is the aim of this paper to explain how the two steps of a single process of logical
reasoning gradually become two different bodies of law unrelated to each other.
6 Here I refer to the position of Kuomintang in the 1990's, that Taiwan was a part of
the Republic of China (R.O.C.).
57 Here I refer to the position held by the Democratic Progress Party and the Taiwanese
Independence Movement, that Taiwan should be a nation-state or sovereign state along-
side, but not part of, of China. For the Taiwanese Independence Movement, see, for ex-
ample, MEI-LING T. WANG, THE DUST THAT NEVER SETTLES: THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE
CAMPAIGN AND U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS (U. Press Am. 1999).
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III. THEORIES FOR CONFLICT OF LAW RULES BETWEEN CHINA AND
TAIWAN
A. Huang Jin
Professor Huang Jin is a professor of law at Wuhan University,
China. His 261-page treatise, Research on the Inter-regional
Conflict of Laws,58 published in 1991, is a book cited by many
scholars in China pioneering the study of "inter-regional conflict
of laws."
Nomenclature is at the core of this issue. According to Lea
Brilmayer and Jack Goldsmith, "conflict of laws" and "private in-
ternational law" are two phrases commonly and properly used in-
terchangeably as labels for the same single topic. 59 According to
another leading casebook, however, "the term Conflict of Laws,
which was coined in Europe in the middle ages, has prevailed in
the United States and a few other common jurisdictions....
Ironically, the term Private International Law, which was coined
in the United States, has prevailed in Europe and the rest of the
world."60 In other words, "private international law" is how that
discipline was traditionally understood in China and Taiwan, but
the word "international" in the traditional label, "private interna-
tional law," as set out in Part II, implicates the sovereignty dis-
pute between China and Taiwan. Then, what should be done to
justify the conflict of law rules between China and Taiwan?
This matter of justification can be perceived as two questions.
The first question is whether China and Taiwan are two nation-
states or one single nation-state. The second question is whether
China and Taiwan should have conflict of law rules for their bi-
lateral relationship. If sovereignty is as important as described
58 HUANG JIN, RESEARCH ON THE INTER-REGIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS (quji chong tu
fa yanjiu) (1991). This book has six chapters: Introduction, "Multiple-Jurisdiction Coun-
tries," "Inter-Regional Conflict of Laws," "General Problems of the Inter-Regional Conflict
of Laws," "Special Problems of the Inter-Regional Conflict of Laws," and "China's Inter-
Regional Conflict of Laws and Solutions to Its Problems."
59 LEA BRILMAYER & JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS xxix
(5th ed., 2002).
60 SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 6. It should be noted that the authors think the two la-
bels "conflict of laws" and "private international law" carry different connotations. How-
ever, the authors also think the two labels describe the same subject matter, as Brilmayer
and Goldsmith do. In contrast, as explained in more detail later, Huang thinks there are
two different subject matters, though the two subject matters are twins.
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in Part II, then the answer to the second question should depend
on the answer to the first question.
How does Huang answer these questions? Huang unambigu-
ously thinks that China and Taiwan are one single nation-state,
but at the same time argues that China and Taiwan should have
conflict of law rules for their bilateral relationship. Huang's posi-
tion on the first question has never been controversial in China,
but his position on the second question has been controversial.
This is because even if Deng Xiao-Ping's one-country-two-systems
formula gives Huang's position political support, theoretical sup-
port in the legal academia is lacking. 61 Rather, it is Huang that
has to provide theoretical support to Deng Xiao-Ping's one-
country-two-systems formula, an unconventional idea at that
time in China, both inside and outside the legal academia.
Huang succeeded, and today China and Taiwan have conflict of
law rules to govern their bilateral relationship, which was un-
conventional or unthinkable in China at the time Huang wrote
his book. Therefore, considering his book should be a good start-
ing point for our inquiry.
Professor Huang begins his book with an extended discussion
of the phrase Fa-Yu (legal area). According to him, Fa-Yu is
roughly equivalent to "territorium legis" in Latin, "Rechtsgebiet"
in German, and "legal unit," "legal region" and "territorial legal
unit" in English. With the exception of "legal unit," he says,
these expressions are conceptually narrower than the phrase Fa-
Yu that he understands. He defines Fa-Yu as the specific scope
in which a unique legal system applies. Further, he identifies
two characteristics: (1) Fa-Yu has a unique legal system; (2) Fa-
Yu is of a specific scope, which might be (1) spatial, (2) with re-
spect to its members, or (3) temporal. If the specific scope is spa-
tial, then the Fa-Yu is Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu, i.e., a specific spatial
area with a unique legal system. 62 He mentions several examples
61 Huang Jin cites Professors Han De-Pei and Lee Shuan-Yuan's article. See HUANG
JIN, supra note 58. Here I refer to the lack of theoretical support in traditional jurispru-
dence, as described in Part II.
62 Later in the book, between pages 37 and 43, Huang lists five common characteristics
of the Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu (spatial Fa-Yu) within a single nation-state (Guo-Jia): (1) The
legal systems of the Fa-Yu's within that nation-state have to be different. (2) The Fa-Yu's
have to be connected to specific areas, or territorial. (3) The Fa-Yu's should be equal in
status, or there will be no conflict of laws because the superior law would prevail. (4) The
legal systems of Shu-Di- Shin-Fa-Yu's lack sovereignty-ness (Ju-Quan-Shin). Huang does
not cite any other scholar for his point. He defines sovereignty-ness as the connectedness
between the legal system of a unitary state and the nation-state sovereignty (Guo-Jia-Ju-
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of Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu: the member states of the Organization of
American States, the Soviet Republics, the Republics of the for-
mer Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom's England, Scotland,
and Northern Ireland. The existence of Fa-Yu, Huang writes,
implies that there are many differences among the legal systems
but it does not mean these differences are "conflicts." From the
perspective of the conflict of civil and commercial laws, three
more conditions must be met before a conflict of laws arises: (1)
People and members of the different Fa-Yu's interact and build
legal relationships, (2) each Fa-Yu recognizes outsiders' civil le-
gal status within that Fa-Yu, (3) each Fa-Yu recognizes the ef-
fects of the legal system of other Fa-Yu's outside those Fa-Yu's.
In the contemporary world, Huang observes, people and members
of the different Fa-Yu's interact more frequently than the old
days, and even those countries that were in long-time seclusion
have to face this reality and open their doors to outsiders. In ad-
dition, Huang continues, each Fa-Yu, in order to facilitate and
promote interaction between their own people or members and
the people or members of other Fa-Yu's, have to recognize outsid-
ers' civil legal status within that Fa-Yu under certain conditions.
Huang then turns to the third and last condition that each Fa-Yu
recognizes the effects of the legal system of other Fa-Yu's. Huang
asserts that there is a latent conflict of laws among the public or
mandatory law of each Fa-Yu, that each Fa-Yu traditionally has
a latent rule that the law of the forum governs the problems of
public or mandatory law, and that the latent rule in the tradition
of each Fa-Yu denies the effects of the legal system of other Fa-
Yu's outside those Fa-Yu's, thereby eliminating this kind of con-
flict of laws. 63
So far two intriguing points should be noted. First, Huang
does not use sovereignty or jurisdiction as the basic unit of
Quan). According to this definition, Huang states that Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu's are under na-
tion-state sovereignty, that they are components of a single nation-state, they are not
themselves sovereigns, and that therefore the legal system of Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu's lack
sovereignty-ness. He also states that the lack of sovereignty-ness leads to the limits the
legislations of central governments can impose on each Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu, and to the
conclusion that the conflict of laws among Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu's within a single nation-
state is inter-regional conflict of laws, instead of international conflict of laws. (5) Each
Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu is under the sovereignty of its nation-state, and therefore inevitably
subject to the limits imposed by the treaties signed and legislations made by the central
government.
63 See HUANG JIN, supra note 58, at 37-43.
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analysis, which is unconventional and therefore difficult.64 This
difficulty makes it necessary for Huang to explain the concept of
Fa-Yu in a highly abstract fashion, comparing similar phrases in
several languages, which turns out to be an advantage-an aca-
demic, as opposed to a political, tone. 65 Second, Huang is some-
what ambivalent about whether to limit himself to civil and
commercial laws. At one point Huang writes that "[f]rom the
perspective of the conflict of civil and commercial laws, three
more conditions must be met before a conflict of law arises" 66 and
discusses "outsiders' civil legal status" 67 only, but later he asserts
that "there is a latent conflict of laws among the public or man-
datory law of each Fa-Yu." 68 To be sure, Huang does not attempt
to deal with the conflict of public or mandatory laws, but this ar-
gument, that conflict of laws is a phenomenon in both the area of
civil or commercial law and the area of public or mandatory law,
makes more persuasive his claim that conflict of laws is a reality
that must be faced at the time he writes.69
Then, Huang asserts that Fa-Yu is specific to its scope, which
might be (1) spatial, (2) with respect to its members, or (3) tem-
poral, and that accordingly there are three kinds of conflict of
laws: (1) spatial, (2) with respect to the members of that Fa-Yu,
and (3) temporal. Huang defines his subject of study as concern-
ing only the spatial conflict of laws, also known as Shu-Di-Shin-
Fa-Yu. Huang then divides the spatial conflict of laws into three
kinds, among different regional international organizations,
among different nation-states (guojia), and among the different
64 Huang later in the book, on page 46 at the end of Chapter Two, and as one of the spe-
cial problems of Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu's, discusses the usage of the term "Fa-Yu" vis-A-vis
nation and state. Huang observes that, in common law countries such as the United
Kingdom and the United States, the law of the conflict of laws, albeit with slight differ-
ences, solves both international and inter-regional conflict of laws. And as a result, schol-
ars in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States study the law of the
conflict of laws without differentiating between international and inter-regional private
law. Under this circumstance, they do not 'like" to use "law district" to describe the Fa-
Yu's within a nation-state, they more often use "country" or "state" to describe Fa-Yu. In
order to support his claim, Huang cites the statutes of the United Kingdom in DICEY AND
MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (9th ed., 1973) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
65 See HUANG JIN, supra note 58, at 1. Also, Huang uses phrases like "[iun the contem-
porary world", "the old days", "have to face the reality," to frame in a less political way the
policy question whether to allow cross-border interaction. See id. at 3.
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regions within a single nation-state. Huang states that, under
usual or ordinary circumstances, a nation-state is an independ-
ent Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu, but there are several Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-
Yu's with different legal systems in some nation-states, for vari-
ous historical, practical, and external or internal reasons. Huang
then distinguishes the spatial conflict of laws among different
nation-states (guojia) from the spatial conflict of laws among the
different regions within a single nation-state. According to
Huang, the spatial conflict of laws among different nation-states
is the subject matter for private international law, also known as
international conflict of laws, while the spatial conflict of laws
among the different regions within a single nation-state is the
subject matter of inter-regional conflict of laws, also known as
private inter-regional law. After distinguishing three kinds of
the spatial conflict of laws, Huang chooses as his subject of study
inter-regional conflict of laws, also known as private inter-
regional law.7 0
In the last paragraph Huang introduces the idea of private in-
ter-regional law into the China/Taiwan context. At the beginning
of his explanation, Huang provides his own definition of Fa-Yu,
and then squares his idea of Fa-Yu with the traditional sover-
eignty norm, producing three kinds of spatial conflicts of laws.
Huang concedes that "under usual or ordinary circumstances, a
nation-state is an independent Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu", but he
shortly adds that "there are several Shu-Di-Shin-Fa-Yu's with
different legal systems in some nation-states, for various histori-
cal or practical, and external or internal reasons".71 To be sure, in
Chapter Two, Huang lists ten "various historical or practical, and
external or internal reasons,"72 but I presume that it is not his
concern. Nor is his goal to explain the usual or ordinary circum-
stances under which a nation-state is an independent Shu-Di-
Shin-Fa-Yu. Rather, he accepts the bright-line traditional sover-
eignty norm as exogenously given, while at the same time, argu-
ing that conflict of laws is a subject matter with little, or no, re-
gard to the traditional sovereignty norm. According to him, there
are three kinds of spatial conflicts of laws encompassing all the
70 See id. at 4.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 15-24.
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logically possible matches between Fa-Yu and nation-state. 73 He
carefully and unambiguously distinguishes private international
law from private inter-regional law based on the premise that
conflict of laws exists not only between nation-states, but also
within a single nation-state. This premise is intriguing for a sub-
tle but important reason. Huang asserts it in the neutral tone of
"there are", describing it and at the same time asserting the exis-
tence of something. Conflict of law rules are not a concrete thing,
and therefore the existence of conflict of law rules for the inter-
state legal disputes in the United States, for example, itself does
not logically lead to the descriptive existence or desirability of
conflict of law rules for the legal disputes in another nation-state,
such as China.74
It should be noted that I am not taking issue with Huang's
conclusion that conflict of laws is a subject matter with little or
no regard to the traditional sovereignty norm. In fact, Huang's
conclusion indeed has support from well-regarded scholars. For
example, a leading casebook on conflict of laws so defines its sub-
ject of study:
The law of Conflict of Laws is that branch of the law that as-
pires to provide solutions to international or interstate legal
disputes between persons or entities other than countries or
states as such. A dispute is considered international or inter-
state if one or more of its constituent elements are connected
with more than one country or state. These elements may be
the events that give rise to the dispute, the location of its ob-
ject, or the nationality, citizenship, domicile, residence, or
other affiliation of the parties. Thus a contract dispute be-
tween citizens of different countries, or domiciliaries or resi-
dents of different states, or a property dispute between resi-
dents of one state regarding assets situated in another state,
or a tort resulting from conduct occurring in one state and
73 The three logically possible matches between Fa-Yu and nation-state are: First, that
the conflict of laws arise between two Fa-Yu's within a nation-state, or secondly, the con-
flict of laws arise between two Fa-Yu's which are simultaneously two nation-states, or
thirdly, the conflict of laws arise between two Fa-Yu's, at least one of which encompasses
two or more nation-states. See id. at 4.
74 Here I am not concerned with whether China has always been, is, or should be, a na-
tion-state. Here I am simply stating the prevailing view in China that China is a nation-
state.
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causing injury in another state are all examples of disputes
that fall within the scope of this subject. 75
In the footnote after the word "state" quoted above, a further
definition for that word is provided:
Hereafter the word 'state' is used to denote any country or
a territorial subdivision of a country, such as a state or
province that has its own system of private law. Thus, the
United States, a state of the United States, a Canadian
province, or France are 'states' within the meaning of this
definition. Cases involving the laws of more than one sate
are referred to hereafter as 'multistate' cases.7 6
In my view, this casebook supports Huang's argument that
conflict of laws is a subject matter with little or no regard for the
traditional sovereignty norm. Against the deeply entrenched
traditional sovereignty norm in China, however, Huang cannot
afford to do what Symeon C. Symeonides, Wendy Collins Perdue,
and Arthur T. Von Mehren do in that casebook-to treat "inter-
national" and "interstate" as interchangeable using the word "or,"
and then adding "any country or any territorial subdivision" in a
footnote. 77 Huang has to do a lot of work to accomplish what
scholars elsewhere may deem easy to deal with.
Huang's argument that conflict of laws has little regard to sov-
ereignty has significant consequences. As noted earlier, according
to traditional jurisprudence basically two questions are involved.
The first question is whether China and Taiwan are, and/or
should be, two nation-states or one single nation-state. The sec-
ond question is whether China and Taiwan should have conflict
of law rules for their bilateral relationship. Although Huang's
overall direction in 1991 was to adapt private international law
to circumstances under China's one-China principle, Huang ac-
complished more: Conflict of laws is a subject matter with little
or no regard to the traditional sovereignty norm, which matches
Tung-Pi Chen's theory discussed in the next section. This was a
major accomplishment because it provided necessary stability in
the conflict of law rules throughout the ups and downs in the
overall China/Taiwan relationship.
75 SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 1. To be sure, this is used as "a tentative definition" by
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It is not difficult to see that Huang's overall goal in 1991 was to
adapt private international law to circumstances under China's
one-China principle. Although inter-regional conflict of laws
starts to appear in Huang's book on page four, the remainder of
Huang's 261-page book is not exclusively devoted to inter-
regional conflict of laws. Indeed, on page five of Huang's book, he
both discusses inter-regional conflict of laws in other countries
and compares inter-regional conflict of laws with other areas of
law. Additionally on page five, however, Huang observes that,
throughout the history of conflict of laws, private international
law and inter-regional private law are similar to twins, which,
according to him, means that the development of any one of the
two is closely connected to the development of the other.78
This twin relationship is so close that Huang defines private
inter-regional law by reference to the definition of private inter-
national law. On page five, Huang begins to define the subject
matter of inter-regional conflict of laws by considering the subject
matter of private international law in common law jurisdictions,
civil law jurisdictions, the Soviet Union and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries. On page six, Huang admits that both (1) juris-
diction and (2) recognition and enforcement of judgments made
by other Fa-Yu's are closely connected to inter-regional private
law. However, Huang asserts that the rules about jurisdiction,
recognition and enforcement of judgments made by other Fa-Yu's
are procedural law, and since procedural law is in the area of
public law, and therefore it is, strictly speaking, not part of inter-
regional private law.79
To be sure, defining private inter-regional law by private in-
ternational law risks making private inter-regional law appear
unduly dependent on private international law, and what Huang
does immediately is to turn this relationship of dependency on its
head. On page seven Huang asserts that the "theory of private
international law" before the eighteenth century was principally
a theory of inter-regional conflict of laws. Huang cites, among
other people, Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313-1357) from Italy, and
Ulricus Huber (1624-1694) from the Netherlands, as the prime
examples of the "inter-regional" origin of private international
78 See HUANG JIN, supra note 58, at 5.
79 In so doing, Huang successfully downplays governments' role in so-called private law.
See id. at 6.
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law. Huang cites Albert A. Ehrenzweig, a professor of law at
University of California, Berkeley, who said that, throughout the
history of private international law, international conflicts and
inter-regional conflicts have always been intertwined.80 Hence
Huang draws the inference that studying inter-regional conflict
of laws is beneficial for "us scholars of private international
law"8 1 to understand more deeply the historical development of
private international law and the development of the theory of
private international law.8 2
After stating the importance of private inter-regional law,
Huang continues on page nine to page eleven to assert that for-
eign scholars pay more attention to inter-regional private law
than to private international law, by citing scholars in Russia,
the United States, Australia, Canada, Italy, Switzerland, Ger-
many, Yugoslavia, and Austria. On pages eleven and twelve
Huang laments that Chinese scholars have long lagged behind
foreign scholars in the study of private international law, which,
combined with the fact that there has never been any inter-
regional conflict of laws problems in China, leads to the sparse
attention paid to the sister subject of private international law-
inter-regional private law.8 3
On pages twelve and thirteen, Huang adds "China's reality
needs and waits for deeper research on inter-regional private
law."8 4 He cites the one-country-two-system formula, and the out-
look that Hong Kong and Macau would be governed according to
that formula beginning in 1997 and 1999. Although Huang is
uncertain when Taiwan would follow in the footsteps of Hong
Kong and Macau, he optimistically thinks it is just a matter of
time. As a result, Huang, writing in 1991, predicted that China
would increasingly become a country with several Fa-Yu's begin-
ning in 1997. Huang cites Professor Han De-Pei and Professor
80 Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segrega-
tion, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717, 717 (1957) (stating that American courts and writers assumed
similar principles governing international and interstate transactions).
81 HUANG JIN, supra note 58, at 8.
82 Huang cites Edoardo Vitta, a professor of private international law at the University
of Florence, for expressing this viewpoint. See Edoardo Vitta, Interlocal Conflict of Laws,
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. III, at 9-3 (1985).
83 HUANG JIN, supra note 58, at 11-12.
84 Id. at 12-13.
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Lee Shuan-Yuan's 1983 article,8 5 which called for more research
on the conflict of laws due to the forecasted need to resolve the
conflict of laws arising among the different regions within China
after 1997.
Huang's Chapter Two discusses "Multiple Fa-Yu's Countries."
Huang cites ten reasons for the emergence of countries with mul-
tiple Fa-Yu's throughout history. On page twenty-two, Huang
discusses the "unification of divided countries" as one of such
reasons, and puts the "future unification between mainland
China and Taiwan" as one of the examples, along with the di-
vided Germany and Korea after the Second World War. Huang
then purports to offer the taxonomy of 'Multiple-Jurisdiction (Fa-
Yu) Countries" according to the ten reasons for their emergence,
after describing taxonomies offered by scholars such as Edoardo
Vitta,86 Ronald Harry Graveson,8 7 Istvin Szjszy,8 8 and Otto
Kahn-Freund. 89
It is useful to go on to consider Huang's whole book, but I
should stop here and leave the rest to future research. In sum,
we can draw two conclusions.
First, through the efforts pioneered by Huang, the concept of
"private inter-regional law" (qu ji si fa) was introduced to China
and Taiwan. Besides, Huang successfully establishes in the
China/Taiwan context the irrelevance between the conflict of law
rules and traditional sovereignty norm, even though Huang him-
self unambiguously thinks that China and Taiwan are two parts
of a single nation-state, i.e., China.
Second, Huang draws on foreign examples and foreign schol-
arly work in order to help him establish that irrelevance. He
gains an important advantage in his purportedly academic en-
deavor pushing the front of human knowledge. In so doing, he
avoids criticizing China's and Taiwan's decades long policies, but
85 Id. Huang cites an article written in Chinese: Han De-pei & Li Shuang-yuan, The Re-
search on Conflict of Laws Should be Emphasized (yinggai zhongshi dui chongtufa
de yanjiu), J. WUHAN U. (wuhan daxue xuebao), No. 6, p. 59 (1983).
86 Vitta, supra note 82.
87 RONALD H. GRAVESON, COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS VOL. I
(1977).
88 ISTVAN SZASZY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE WESTERN, SOCIALIST AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (A.W. Sijthoff-Leiden 1974).
89 OTTO KAHN-FREUND, GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sijthoff
1976).
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no doubt he supports China's new policy toward Taiwan with his
latest academic research in the area of private inter-regional law.
B. Tung-Pi Chen
Another important work on the relationship between sover-
eignty and private international law is Bridge Across the For-
mosa Strait: Private Law Relations Between Taiwan and the
Mainland China,90 a law review article published in 1990 by Pro-
fessor Tung-Pi Chen, a professor of law at Queen's University,
Canada, purporting to explain "a legal framework for private re-
lations."91
As set out earlier, according to traditional jurisprudence, basi-
cally there are two questions: The first question is whether China
and Taiwan are two nation-states or one single nation-state. The
second question is whether China and Taiwan should have con-
flict of law rules for their bilateral relationship. As also dis-
cussed earlier, although Huang unambiguously thinks that
China and Taiwan are one single nation-state, he argues that
China and Taiwan should have conflict of law rules for their bi-
lateral relationship. In contrast, Chen devises a different re-
search question. In the section titled as "a general theory,"92
Chen defines his question as "how the rival regimes can justify
and build a legal framework for private relationships between
their people in an environment of non-recognition and of official
hostility."93 In other words, the question whether China and
Taiwan are two nation-states or one single nation-state, accord-
ing to Chen, should have no bearing on the question whether
China and Taiwan should have conflict of law rules for their bi-
lateral relationship. The following pages try to describe how
Chen arrives at his conclusion.
Chen begins with the view of the orthodox international law
scholarship that both an unrecognized government and its acts
are null.94 However, Chen also finds a modern alternative accord-
90 Chen, supra note 3.
91 Id. at 106.
92 Id. at 106.
93 Id. at 106.
94 Id. at 106. Chen introduces his idea in this paragraph:
Orthodox international law scholarship holds that 'no judicial existence can be
attributed to an unrecognized government .... [B]oth [an] unrecognized gov-
ernment and its acts are a nullity.' By the strictest application of this theory,
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ing to which recognition of foreign law in private international
law is 'largely independent of recognition of foreign governments
in public international law."95 Chen builds an orthodox/modern
contrast, but purports to be only finding, rather than building,
such an orthodox/modern contrast. This is a smart strategy. On
the one hand, the orthodox/modern contrast does not deny le-
gitimacy to the traditional jurisprudence in which sovereignty is
pivotal. In fact, Chen calls traditional jurisprudence "orthodox."
On the other hand, the modern label implies his point of view
that the needs of the late 1980s do not fit the orthodoxy.
Then, Chen lists five reasons why the modern alternative, in
his view, should prevail over orthodox international law scholar-
ship. Each of the five reasons should be described and discussed.
Chen's first reason is that the modern alternative promotes
fairness by acknowledging reality. 96 However, the emphasis on
reality, and thereby fairness, might be a misplaced attack on the
an unrecognized government, its agents, and its legal creations have no legal
status, capacity, or diplomatic immunity, and the judgments of its courts are
unenforceable in the country that does not recognize the government.
(quoting H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 145-47 (1947)).
95 Chen cites A. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-85 (1967), for the paragraph
cited below:
There is a modern alternative to the orthodox view. According to the newer
theory, recognition of foreign law in private international law is largely inde-
pendent of recognition of foreign governments in public international law. Pub-
lic recognition is an executive act, influenced by moral approval of foreign gov-
ernments and constrained by the vagaries of international politics. Recognition
in private international law, whether through a judicial, administrative, or leg-
islative act, is influenced by considerations of fairness to the parties and by a
desire to facilitate private relations. Since the fundamental aims of public and
private recognition are different, they can operate independently. Thus, the
modern theory holds that the capacity, laws, and immunity of a firmly estab-
lished but unrecognized foreign government can be given full legal effect in the
domestic jurisdiction, provided of course that such recognition is not contrary
to the public policy of the forum.
Chen, supra note 3, at 107 (footnotes omitted).
96 Chen's entire argument on this issue is quoted in full here:
The overwhelming weight of legal scholarship over the last quarter century
supports the latter theory. By acknowledging reality, the theory promotes fair-
ness to the parties. The orthodox view presumes that the judicial, administra-
tive, and executive branches must all speak with one voice on matters of recog-
nition. But the executive itself will often hold an implicit policy of split
recognition: it may allow or even encourage private relations with de facto for-
eign governments while international political realities prevent it from extend-
ing official recognition. In such a situation, the 'one voice' argument in fact
supports the modern view. The courts will conflict with the executive unless
they recognize the latter's dual policy. In any case, dangers of inconsistency on
matters of recognition are minimized by looking to the public policy of the ju-
risdiction.
Id. at 107-08 (footnote omitted).
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orthodox view. Sir Lauterpacht, the exponent of the orthodox
view Chen describes, of course took note of the divergence be-
tween judicial existence and actual existence, or he would not
have written "no judicial existence can be attributed to an unrec-
ognized government.... [B]oth [an] unrecognized government
and its acts are nullity."9 The real question Sir Lauterpacht and
the traditional theory addressed is: which one of the two-
judicial existence and actual existence-should be the standard
by which governments judge the validity of the acts of the gov-
ernments whose legitimacy they do not recognize? Choosing ac-
tual existence, instead of judicial existence, might promote fair-
ness to the parties by "acknowledging reality", but then judicial
existence loses its importance as a concept. In other words, Chen
fundamentally doubts the value of judicial existence as a con-
cept. 98
Chen's second reason is that, even if the court and the execu-
tive need to speak with only one voice for foreign affairs, as the
orthodox international law scholarship posits, the court should
nonetheless adopt the modern alternative when the executive be-
gins to hold "an implicit policy of split recognition," because the
executive's implicit policy of split recognition, coupled with the
need for the court and the executive to speak with only one voice,
should make the court follow, rather than overrule, the execu-
tive's implicit policy of split recognition. 99
In my view, Chen here invented two legal doctrines. First of
all, if I am not mistaken, the possibility of such "an implicit pol-
icy of split recognition" 100 as a viable option is Chen's own inven-
tion, itself breaking from the orthodox international law scholar-
ship Chen describes. If recognition can possibly be "split," then
sovereignty is no longer an either-or, all-or-nothing matter,
which turns the orthodox international law scholarship upside
down. Just as it does not make much sense to compare an apple
with an ox, it does not make much sense to compare the ortho-
doxy with a modern alternative of a fundamentally different na-
ture. Secondly, even if recognition can be split, Chen seems to
jump to the conclusion that the court should follow, rather than
97 Id. at 106.
98 Id. at 108 (supposing that "[t]he courts will conflict with the executive unless they
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question, the executive's "implicit" judgment whether and when
to hold a policy of split recognition, which is again Chen's own
invention running against orthodox international law scholar-
ship. As a whole, Chen invented two doctrines to turn the speak-
with-one-voice argument back against the orthodox international
law scholarship.
Chen's third reason is that the doctrine of necessity, based on
the 1970 Namibia case by the International Court of Justice, dis-
tinguishes ministerial tasks from political acts, and argues that
the ministerial tasks done by unrecognized governments should
be valid. 101 It should be noted, however, that Chen's third reason
moves from the original question-whether acts of unrecognized
governments should be nullities-to a more general but only re-
motely relevant, question-whether it is desirable to harm the
interests of the innocent inhabitants by denying legal effects to
illegal and invalid government acts. The question Chen asks
here-whether illegal and invalid government acts should harm
the interests of the innocent inhabitants-is relevant only be-
cause of the consequences, i.e., declared nullities. However, con-
sequence-oriented thinking is closer to policy analysis as opposed
to legal analysis, if legal analysis should include only legal doc-
trines, syllogisms, and the like, as Chen purports to do in his ar-
ticle.102
101 Id. at 107. Chen's argument is here quoted in its entirety:
Furthermore, the modern theory is solidly grounded in the well-known doctrine
of necessity in private international law. This doctrine was first described in
the 17th century by Hugo Grotius, the father of international law. The doctrine
of necessity now holds that acts done by an unlawful regime to preserve order
and good government should be obeyed by citizens and should be enforced by
the courts. It forms the theoretical foundation of international practice and has
been approved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a 1970 Namibia
case. In that case, the ICJ ruled: "[While official acts performed by the Gov-
ernment of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termina-
tion of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended
to those acts, such as for instance, the registration of births, deaths and mar-
riages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabi-
tants of the Territory."
Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted). Here Chen quotes, in part, Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa),
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 56 (Advisory
Opinion of June 21), and cites HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 91-94
(A.C. Campbell trans. 1901).
102 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("If ever a court
was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented approach, this case is a prime example.").
See also THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 209 (David Kennedy & William W.
Fisher III eds., Princeton University Press 2006) (defining "policy' as "a loose umbrella for
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Chen's fourth reason is that common sense also supports the
modern view rather than the orthodox view:
Finally, if the conflict of laws rules in one country disre-
gard the doctrine of necessity and do not recognize the
effect of laws and measures of unrecognized govern-
ments, the result would be a legal vacuum: legally sanc-
tioned transactions would not exist; companies legally
established by the laws of unrecognized governments
would be considered non-existent and could not sue or be
sued in the non-recognizing jurisdiction; marriages es-
tablished under the laws of unrecognized governments
would be void; children born under these marriages
would be illegitimate; and court judgments on divorce,
succession, and commercial affairs would be nullities.
Common sense, as well as personal and commercial
needs, requires an approach which avoids these unhappy
consequences. 103
The danger of "a legal vacuum", however, might be exagger-
ated. Chen starts with the goal of seeking to promote and sus-
tain economic and social interdependence between China and
Taiwan, and, as a result, Chen surely needs the modern ap-
proach, as he calls it. This is because otherwise the economic and
social interdependence cannot be sustained, not to mention pro-
moted. However, in the orthodox international law scholarship,
the goal to sustain and promote economic and social interde-
pendence between China and Taiwan does not exist. In the years
when the orthodox international law scholarship was dominant
between China and Taiwan, there were fewer conflict of law
cases and the "personal and commercial needs" were less inten-
sive as compared with today's situation. In other words, Chen
prefers the modern view to orthodox international law scholar-
ship for a policy reason-to promote and sustain economic and
social interdependence between China and Taiwan. As a result,
this preference, itself a policy choice, cannot be adequately put in
legal terms.
attending to social conditions, functional purposes, broad social goals, and ethical com-
mitments.").
103 Chen, supra note 3, at 108-09 (emphasis added). In his footnote Chen states that an
explanation of the theory of a legal vacuum can be found in Lord Wilberforce's opinion in
Carl.Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., 1 A.C. 853, 953 (H.L. 1967).
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Chen's fifth reason is that "International practice varies, but
the trend is toward adoption of the newer, more pragmatic
view." 10 4 "Where judicial practice is mixed, legislatures have fre-
quently stepped in to ensure the application of the modern ap-
proach." 105 Viewed in retrospect, however, if there were such
trend of international practice, the co-existence of conflict and in-
terdependence and of the two bodies of law, as discussed in Part
II of this article, should not be puzzling at all. Besides, Chen
cites only one book for what he labeled as "the modern ap-
proach"-Private International Law, written by Alexander Elder
Anton and published in 1967. However, the title of that book, in
its entirety, is Private International Law: A Treatise from the
Standpoint of Scots Law, which was a big surprise for me when I
retrieved that book from the library shelf. This is because the
omission of the Scottish origin in the citation helps paint the im-
age of a widespread trend. Given the fact that Professor Anton
"attempts to deal in a systematic way with the Scottish rules of
private international law," 106 one must ask: What is the rele-
vance and weight a Scottish standpoint of law can provide for the
China/Taiwan context? However, if Chen's article is a search for
a legal basis for a policy already favored or decided, then every
law or treatise fitting the policy already favored or decided, even
from the Standpoint of Scots law, is of help.
"[I]nevitably," 10 7 Chen concludes that:
The weight of legal theory, as well as judicial, admin-
istrative, and legislative practices worldwide, indicate
that there are solid theoretical bases and precedents
for establishing normal private law relationships be-
tween Taiwan and the PRC. The two governments
need not reach an agreement on public recognition in
order to allow full private relations, and the estab-
lishment of such relations need not lead to any public
international law consequences. Further, the fact that
each government officially views the other as a rival-
rather than merely as an unrecognized regime-
104 Chen, supra note 3, at 109.
105 Id. at 110.
106 ALEXANDER ELDER ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE FROM THE
STANDPOINT OF SCOTS LAW, at v (Scottish Universities Law Institute [by] Green 1967).
107 Tung-Pi Chen's word. Chen, supra note 3, at 117.
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provides no serious barriers to the establishment of
private relations. 08
In short, Chen's goal, stated by him as an inevitable conclusion
of a purely academic exercise, is to establish the irrelevance be-
tween, on the one hand, the question whether China and Taiwan
are, and/or should be, two nation-states or one single nation-
state, and, on the other hand, the question whether China and
Taiwan should have conflict of law rules for their bilateral rela-
tionship.
After concluding the legal analysis, Chen touches upon policy
reasons:
Finally, the overlap between the PRC's 'one country,
two systems' reunification proposal and Taiwan's 'one
country, two governments' concept provides a strong
policy basis upon which private law relations can be
built. As discussed earlier, while the governments con-
tinue to disagree over the issue of international repre-
sentation, both seem willing to recognize the de facto
authority of the other over private matters within
their respective territories. Even without full agree-
ment on the reunification proposals, authorities on
both sides can use the common ground as a starting
point for legislative initiatives facilitating private re-
lationships. 109
At first glance, policy analysis comes into play only at this
point, after all the legal analyses. However, as has been made
clear, Tung-Pi Chen puts great emphasis on Chinese and Tai-
wanese policies to promote and sustain the social and economic
interdependence between China and Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
In Part I, I provided a sketch of the conflict of law rules that
exist between China and Taiwan today. In Part II, I described
the importance of sovereignty from two perspectives-the social
and historical background of the China/Taiwan relationship, and
the traditional jurisprudence. In Part III, I introduced to readers
the works done by Professor Huang Jin and Professor Tung-Pi
108 Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 112.
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Chen supportive of the conflict of law rules between China and
Taiwan. Though in different ways, Huang and Chen made pre-
dominant the argument that China and Taiwan should have con-
flict of law rules between them regardless of their sovereignty
dispute. This argument is the primary legal foundation on which
China and Taiwan build their current social and economic inter-
dependence. Today's legal and policy documents, and mass media
are replete with the vocabulary Huang Jin and Tung-Pi Chen
pioneered. Their argument, in my view, suggests a new under-
standing of sovereignty; that sovereignty itself remains intact but
becomes disconnected from other issues.
The aim of this article is simply to provocatively call for more
research on this topic. The research to date is still thin and I will
wait for more research before I can judge whether the conflict of
law rules are desirable, and by what standard.
